Iraq’s hardline factions offer Baghdad a two-year pause instead of their weapons

The deadline governing the file is 30 September, the date al-Zaidi set for weapons to be confined to the state. The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung notes it is not an arbitrary one: “the stated timeline for disarmament of 30 September 2026 coincides with the withdrawal of the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve military presence from Iraq.” On 28 August, Seth J. Frantzman wrote for FDD’s Long War Journal, citing a Rudaw report of 27 August, that several militias have proposed to “freeze” their activity for two years instead. Rudaw put the number of refusing factions at five and named three — Kataib Hezbollah, Sayyid al-Shuhada and Harakat al-Nujaba. The report says Washington rejected the proposal, but no US official is named and the State Department declined to comment; that is a claim, not a position. On the record, an unnamed US official told Al Hurra on 25 August that the United States “fully supports the disarmament of the factions and the transfer of their weapons to the central Iraqi government.” Al Hurra is funded by the US government through MBN.

The National draws the distinction the wires blur: the Popular Mobilisation Forces are the legal, state-salaried umbrella created in 2014, while the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is the looser Iran-aligned network whose members are also, in many cases, inside the PMF. A group can therefore hand weapons to the PMF and lose nothing. That is not hypothetical. CTP-ISW recorded that the spokesman for Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s political wing claimed on 12 August that the militia had handed its medium and heavy weapons, including drones and missiles, to unspecified PMF brigades — and that Asaib Ahl al-Haq controls three PMF brigades. The claim is the militia’s own and unverified. The National reports analysts expect symbolic handovers rather than full disarmament, with the Badr Organisation the pivotal actor. A Kataib Hezbollah spokesman, unnamed in the report, told The National on 20 August: “Our patience with the frivolous young Prime Minister Ali Al Zaidi has lasted for more than 100 days.”

The coercive option has been briefed rather than taken. CTP-ISW reported on 14 August, sourcing unspecified Iraqi political sources, that al-Zaidi had ordered a study of security and logistical conditions in Jurf al-Sakhr, the Babil province enclave Kataib Hezbollah has kept outside federal control for over a decade and used to store weapons and launch attacks, including in March and April 2026. One plan under consideration would deploy Iraqi security forces to take the area. CTP-ISW attaches its own caveat, which is the honest one: such leaks “may intend to encourage Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to acquiesce to the federal government and voluntarily disarm by September 30.” The state doing the coercing remains unfinished. Parliament confirmed 14 ministers of a 23-seat cabinet when al-Zaidi took the oath on 14 May; interior and defence were among the posts left vacant. He told Sky News on 27 June he would complete the cabinet within two weeks.

Assessment: Read the freeze proposal as price discovery, not capitulation. The factions have found the one currency Baghdad can accept in public and they can pay without cost: time. The Asaib Ahl al-Haq transfer shows the plumbing — an armoury moved between two pockets of the same coat, announced by the man wearing it. KAS offers the better yardstick than the Washington one: measured against full disarmament the government fails by definition, so watch instead whether attack tempo and cross-border reach fall. Distrust two things today: an American rejection no American will confirm, and a Jurf al-Sakhr operation whose only evidence is that someone wanted it reported.