Both of Saudi Arabia’s export doors are now constrained, and Riyadh is shopping for a Red Sea partner in Cairo
Oil loadings at Yanbu were reported suspended on Tuesday, five days after drone strikes shut the pipeline that feeds it, while the Strait of Hormuz remains barely trafficked and the talks meant to regularise it have been shelved. Two wires are running incompatible perpetrators for the same strike, and Riyadh’s own energy ministry names nobody. On the same day the loadings halt surfaced, Mohammed bin Salman was in Cairo asking Egypt to help secure the maritime route that was supposed to be Saudi Arabia’s answer to Hormuz. Nothing was signed, and no figure was disclosed.
Reuters reported on Tuesday 15 September, citing unnamed shipping industry sources, that crude loadings had been suspended at Yanbu, the Red Sea terminal Saudi Aramco has leaned on more heavily since the war began on 28 February. Aramco declined to comment; Middle East Eye timestamped its live-blog entry at 16:41 BST. The terminal’s problem upstream is documented: the Saudi Ministry of Energy said on its official account, as quoted by Rigzone, that the pipeline “in the Riyadh and Madinah regions was subjected to multiple attacks on the morning of September 10 and subsequently shut down” as a precaution, and that “the attacks resulted in a number of injuries,” without giving a count. Two regional officials told the Associated Press repairs to the 1,200-kilometre East-West line, including a major pumping station, could take three to five weeks, with partial running possible in the interim. Satellite imagery from Vantor, distributed via Reuters, shows damage and fires at a pumping station. Reuters photo captions and Gulf News date the strike to 11 September; the ministry says 10 September.
The perpetrator is not settled. Reuters-derived copy carried by Middle East Eye and BOE Report attributes the pipeline closure to an attack by Yemen’s Houthis. AP, PBS and OilPrice report that the drones were launched from Iraqi territory near the Iranian border and that Riyadh blamed Iran-backed Iraqi militias. The energy ministry’s own statement blames no one. That disagreement now has a thread running through Baghdad: an Iraqi security source told Al Jazeera that traces indicating drone launches were found near the Duwairij river in Maysan, on the Iranian border, and the government relieved the Maysan Operations Commander of his post — an anonymous account of the launches, and an official act consistent with them. The Houthi case is circumstantial but not weak. Bloomberg reported on 10 September that in July, after Riyadh shifted more oil exports to the Red Sea route, the group struck two tankers carrying Saudi crude. Over 12–14 September Houthi forces took Greater and Lesser Hanish, after Mayun and the port of Mokha, and spokesman Brigadier General Yahya Saree claimed an attack on a Saudi air base without saying when it occurred.
The Red Sea route exists because the other one does not work. Ship-tracking data compiled by Kpler and reported by Al Jazeera on 3 September put Hormuz crossings at six, eleven and five vessels on successive days, a ten-day average of thirteen, against a pre-war baseline of roughly 130 a day and a claim by President Donald Trump that the United States is helping around thirty ships cross daily. The diplomacy meant to formalise passage has stalled: Gulf foreign ministers were to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Salalah on 14 September, and Oman shelved it, saying appropriate conditions were not in place. Araghchi had described the meeting to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed as a briefing at which Tehran would hand over maps of a new Iran–Oman route; a senior Iranian official and a Gulf diplomat told MS NOW, via CNBC, that it was a signing. The text has never been published. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi told IRNA the arrangement is “temporary,” two to four months, and does not mean the strait reopens.
That is the context for Tuesday in Cairo. Mohammed bin Salman met President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and the Crown Prince’s statement, carried by AP, said the two men confirmed “their shared commitment to ensuring freedom and security of maritime navigation.” Egypt has a direct revenue stake: Suez Canal Authority chairman Ossama Rabie put fiscal-year revenue at $4.67 billion, up 23 per cent, and July at $505 million on 1,340 transits, with the Authority guiding to $5.8–6.0 billion for calendar 2026 — a recovery that is partly a windfall from oil rerouted away from Hormuz. What Cairo can actually do about Yemeni drones over the southern Red Sea is unstated, and no deposit, investment package or memorandum was reported in any account of the meeting. Xi Jinping was in Cairo on 1 September. Two heads of state in fifteen days, both with a Red Sea and financing subtext, is the pattern; a signed commitment is not yet part of it.
Assessment: The hedge has collapsed into a single exposure. Riyadh shifted barrels west to escape a strait it does not control, and the western route is now the one being shot at, with the pipeline feeding it out for weeks and the terminal reportedly idle. Distrust the tidy version in three places. The loadings halt rests on unnamed shipping sources in one wire, with Aramco silent — it is an operational claim, not a confirmed state action. Rystad’s 230–360 million barrels is modelled on a three-month outage nobody has forecast; the official estimate is three to five weeks. And every description of the Iran–Oman transit arrangement in circulation traces to Iranian officials or Iranian state media, because the text does not exist publicly. The Cairo meeting should be read as procurement, not alliance: Egypt’s incentive is canal traffic, which is cheapest to protect by talking about security rather than supplying it. Watch for money, not language.