Baghdad ends the coalition and legalises the Hashd in the same week, then moves disarmament to 2027

Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi congratulated Iraqis on “this great day, 1st October 2026” and on “the attainment of full and comprehensive Iraqi sovereignty,” crediting the Supreme Religious Authority and the 2014 fatwa of collective-duty jihad rather than the Iraqi army, according to the full statement text published by Iraq Business News. In Baghdad he said “a new phase has begun, defined by Iraq’s sovereignty, the strength of its institutions, the readiness of its forces, unity of decision-making, and balanced partnerships with its friends.” The Pentagon matched him the same day: chief spokesperson Sean Parnell said “the orderly departure of Coalition forces and equipment from Erbil Air Base marks the successful conclusion of the military mission that defeated ISIS in Iraq,” calling it a twelve-year campaign. Xinhua carried the Baghdad declaration at 18:29 local. The multinational task force against regional ISIS activity moves its headquarters to Jordan. Two governments on the record on the same day is as close to confirmation as this file gets — but Parnell named one base, and no US or Iraqi official has stated a residual figure.

The deadline that mattered domestically slipped. In August, The National reported the framing that militia groups were “also required to disarm by September 30”; Rudaw notes the weapons-restriction deadline was pushed. Al-Zaidi’s 1 October text now describes “a serious beginning” to the weapons question under “a clear roadmap and an agreed timetable that will not extend beyond 30th June 2027.” Nine months of new runway were announced in the same breath as sovereignty. The day before, on Tuesday evening 29 September, the Council of Ministers approved the Popular Mobilisation Forces draft law in its twenty-first session and referred it to the Council of Representatives — timestamped by Shafaq at 19:57 UTC and confirmed by the prime minister’s office. Rudaw Arabic reports the draft defines the PMF as part of the Iraqi armed forces and links it to the commander-in-chief; budget-law schedules put the force at 238,075 personnel with a 2024 allocation of 4.5 trillion dinars across roughly seventy predominantly Shia armed groups. The 2016 law that legalised the force had three provisions. This one covers service, retirement and organisation.

What left with the coalition is the part nobody has replaced. Al Jazeera reported on 7 September that the withdrawal includes removal of US air defence systems stationed in Erbil — the layer used to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles and drones during the war now in its seventh month. Al-Zaidi’s answer, announced the same day as the departure, is immediate procurement of a comprehensive national air defence system: a plan, not a capability. He also reaffirmed that Iraqi territory and airspace may not be used as a launchpad or transit corridor against neighbouring states, which is the formula that makes Baghdad acceptable to Tehran and to Washington simultaneously and commits it to neither. In the same 29 September session the cabinet cancelled the committee created under Diwani Order 25274 of 2025 and told the foreign ministry to coordinate directly with the US Treasury, case by case, on designations of individuals and suspect companies — a procedural change in how Iraq handles American sanctions, made the day before the Americans left.

Assessment: Distinguish three things announced on the same day. The coalition departure is confirmed: two governments, both on the record, one named airbase. That US personnel in Iraq now number zero is not confirmed — nobody has said so, and Harir has not been addressed. The PMF law is a cabinet referral, not a statute; the bill died in 2025 over a retirement age of sixty, and the chamber that must pass it may still lack confirmed interior and defence ministers, nine portfolios having been vacant as recently as August. Treat Shafaq’s unnamed “informed sources” on which clauses were cut to clear a reported US veto as exactly that: one outlet, anonymous, and the draft text is unpublished. We found no dated US statement responding to the 29 September vote, which is itself worth watching. And ignore the claim circulating on a currency-speculation newsletter that Kataib Hezbollah will bring the government down over Iranian overflights until it appears on the faction’s own channels.