Iran’s internet kill switch has two claimants and one unpublished order

The National Iranian American Council’s Insights newsletter published on 23 October an account of a report by Zoomon, an Iranian economic news website, dated 21 October, that unnamed “higher authorities” had issued a binding directive requiring international internet access to be cut immediately in the event of a renewed assault on Iran. Zoomon did not publish the document and did not identify the issuing institution. The date of the directive, its scope, any exemptions and the conditions for restoring connectivity are all unknown. NIAC states that the reported order has not been independently verified and has not been publicly confirmed by Iranian authorities. The chain of custody runs from an anonymous originator to an Iranian outlet to a US-based advocacy newsletter; reposts circulating since 23 October are copies of that single item rather than corroboration of it.

What is on the record is a disagreement about authority. Vahid Yazdanian, the deputy communications minister responsible for developing Iran’s National Information Network, told the Iranian technology news agency CITNA on 10 October that renewed war or unrest could bring another shutdown, while stressing that the decision is not his to make and describing the extent of any restrictions as uncertain. He referenced President Masoud Pezeshkian’s stated position that shutdowns should occur only with presidential authorisation, and suggested the president and government could play a greater role — without announcing any change of process. Ahmad Motamedi, a former communications minister, told CITNA on 21 October that the Supreme National Security Council is the body responsible for deciding wartime shutdowns, and that such decisions should follow a collective process. On 14 October, Al Jazeera reported Iran designating Starlink a “tool of war” with hints at further restrictions.

Assessment: Read the directive report as weather, not as fact: the useful signal is that two ministers, one serving and one former, can publicly locate the switch in two different institutions without being contradicted. That ambiguity is not a bureaucratic failure, it is a feature — it lets the presidency disclaim a blackout it did not order and lets the security council impose one without owning it. Expect no confirmation and no denial; a denial would be as informative as a confirmation, which is why neither is likely. Watch instead for whether Zoomon ever publishes the document, and discount any reposted version as fresh sourcing.