Four Executive Designations Since January, and Three Congressional Bills That Have Not Moved
Treasury’s own recitation places Thursday’s action as the fourth against Brotherhood-linked targets in seven months, all under Executive Order 13224. The legislation that would make the label statutory sits where it sat in 2025.
The chain is documented in the government’s own releases. On 13 January Treasury and State jointly designated Muslim Brotherhood branches as terrorist organisations, the action that made the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood an SDGT. A further OFAC action followed on 21 January, cited by name in Treasury’s 23 July release. On 9 March the State Department designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. A second OFAC action came on 12 March. Thursday 23 July brought al-Abyari, three further individuals and three entities, among them the Turkey-based El-Kahira for General Trading, which Treasury says moved “hundreds of thousands of dollars” for Hamas and provided underground banking services, including in cryptocurrency, to the Sweden-based Foxtrot Network. Which chapters were named on 13 January this desk has not verified against the State releases, and that list governs any serious mapping of the international organisation.
Three bills remain live in the 119th Congress: H.R.4397, the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2025, its Senate companion S.2293, and H.R.3883. No floor action, markup or vote inside the 20–27 July window turned up in this sweep, which is an absence of evidence rather than proof of stasis. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, an advocacy think tank that welcomes the policy, reads the July action as Washington moving beyond chapters to “the senior officials, financiers, and facilitators who sustain the movement” — a framing worth attributing rather than adopting, but a testable one: this is the first action in the chain to name a serving officeholder of the transnational General Secretariat, resident in a NATO member state.
Assessment: E.O. 13224 already delivers what the bills would codify — asset freezes, secondary exposure for anyone transacting — without a single vote. That is the attraction and the weakness. What one administration writes with a pen, the next can unwrite with a pen, and every foreign ministry weighing whether to mirror the designation knows it. It is a plausible part of why Britain, Turkey and Indonesia have all stayed quiet while their jurisdictions appear in the same Treasury release. It also shapes the calculation behind any litigation: a movement contesting an executive action is contesting an administration’s policy, not the settled position of the United States.