Jordan referred seven Brotherhood officials to prosecutors a day before Washington’s designation
The Jordanian case rests on the same Lebanon–Hamas evidentiary chain the State Department used against the Lebanese chapter. Nine months into the ban, the movement has met it with near-silence rather than the streets.
On 12 January 2026 in Amman, prosecutors advanced a case against seven former Muslim Brotherhood officials to the Attorney General on charges of money laundering and unauthorised fundraising — three senior figures and four administrative staff, mainly accountants. The following day, the US Treasury designated the Jordanian chapter as a specially designated global terrorist. The New Arab reported on 22 January that Jordanian investigations “reportedly found that the Muslim Brotherhood collected more than 30 million Jordanian dinars over the past few years,” with some money allegedly used to finance domestic political campaigns in 2024; that figure carries the outlet’s own hedges and is not attributed to a named official or a court filing, and should not be treated as established. The legal scaffolding is firmer: Jordan’s top court dissolved the group on 16 July 2020 after 75 years of legal operation, on the pretext that it had failed to rectify its status under Jordanian law.
The ban was reaffirmed in April 2025, when the government raided offices, seized assets and the General Intelligence Department arrested members it accused of manufacturing rockets and drones — with authorities charging that the group planned attacks inside the kingdom after training and funding from the Lebanese wing of Hamas. The Islamic Action Front, which won the most seats of any party in the September 2024 parliamentary election, remains licensed. Writing for the Atlantic Council on 3 February 2026, Aaron Magid found that roughly nine months after the ban “the Muslim Brotherhood’s response has been remarkably restrained”: no large-scale protests, a lowered media profile, no violence, and internal elections halted. Enforcement has continued regardless — in May 2026 authorities broke up what the Interior Ministry called a gathering in Aqaba “organised at the direction of individuals who previously held senior positions within the Brotherhood.”
Assessment: Note whose evidence is whose. The Lebanon–Hamas–Jordan chain that Amman advanced in April 2025 is the same chain State put on the record against the Lebanese chapter in January. Nothing in the public documents establishes whether Washington built on Jordanian intelligence or reached the finding independently, and until that is clear the two files should not be read as mutual corroboration. The 30-million-dinar figure is the weakest load-bearing number on this desk and travels far better than it deserves. Amman’s incentive is legible: prosecute the organisation, keep the Islamic Action Front licensed, and preserve a parliamentary channel to a constituency it cannot ban. The movement’s silence is a calculation, not a collapse.