Sudan’s famine map is now moving in two directions at once

The IPC’s analysis for February–May 2026 put 19.5 million people, about 41 percent of Sudan’s population, in Phase 3 or worse: roughly 14 million in Crisis, more than five million in Emergency and some 135,000 in Catastrophe, with a Risk of Famine identified in 14 areas across North Darfur, South Darfur and South Kordofan. The Famine Review Committee found famine conditions occurring in Al Fasher and in Kadugli, towns largely cut off from commercial supply and aid, with outcomes unpredictable for around 841,000 people including Dilling and parts of South Kordofan. UNICEF expects 825,000 children under five to suffer severe acute malnutrition this year, seven percent above 2025 and 25 percent above the pre-war baseline; nearly 100,000 were admitted for treatment in the first quarter alone.

The same dataset carries a correction the desk should not bury: an estimated 3.4 million people are no longer at Phase 3 or above compared with the previous analysis, following gradual stabilisation since May 2025 in Khartoum, Al Jazirah and Sennar, where fighting eased, families returned and markets and access reopened. Hunger in Sudan is not moving in one direction. It follows control. The same logic applies to El Obeid, where the framing has lagged the facts: the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission on 3 September described a city under “severe strain and partial siege”, while Watan’s 9 September report from the city describes schools open, fruit sellers and buses running, and quotes a taxi driver, Ahmed al-Mardi, saying residents have adapted to intermittent attacks and that he intends to stay whatever the conditions.

Adaptation is not relief. The Fact-Finding Mission found foreign suppliers had “substantially enhanced the drone capabilities of both the RSF and the SAF, enabling them to strike far beyond front lines”, documenting RSF strikes at Kalogi in South Kordofan that killed 114 people including around 60 children, SAF strikes at Ad-Da’ein in East Darfur that killed at least 70 and destroyed a major hospital, and repeated RSF strikes on El Obeid through July and August. The ICRC said on 6 September that active missing-person cases have passed 11,000 and that 70 to 80 percent of health facilities in conflict zones have stopped working. IOM recorded over 200,000 newly displaced in Kordofan by 20 August, with displacement in Sheikan district, which contains El Obeid, up 25 percent in eight months.

Assessment: The useful distinction this month is between siege and interdiction. A city that is shelled and encircled produces famine classifications; a city that is bombed from the air but resupplied by road produces casualty counts and functioning markets. El Obeid has moved from the first category toward the second, which is why the ‘next El Fasher' framing from July no longer fits. Two cautions. Yale’s satellite work in January attributed new earthworks along El Obeid’s exit routes to the army and allied groups, not the RSF — encirclement is not a one-party technique. And the 3.4 million improvement is a function of quiet, not of aid funding, which makes it reversible the moment the front moves west.