Weeks after the north-east dissolved into the state, the language fight reopened
An Education Ministry decision capping Kurdish-language instruction at three classes a week has drawn protests in Tel Tamr, Darbasiyah and Tirbespiyê. The military question was settled in January. The civil one was not.
ANHA reports that Syria’s Ministry of Education has issued a decision limiting Kurdish-language instruction to three classes per week, and has logged continuing protests against it: demonstrations in Tel Tamr and Darbasiyah on 2 October, and students in Tal Ma’ruf, in the Tirbespiyê area, saying they have been taught in Kurdish since they started school. On 3 October the agency published what it called a preliminary statistic: more than 185,000 male and female students registered to study in Kurdish across Hasakah, Aleppo, Damascus and Hama. Both the decision and the figure are single-sourced to a partisan outlet — ANHA belongs to the administration whose case the number serves — and the agency itself labels the count preliminary. The ministry’s text has not been published, and no state official has been quoted on it.
The same budgets carry the broader argument. A human rights lawyer, Ali Iskan, and Zulikha Abdi of the Educational Research Academy are both pressing for Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights in the permanent constitution; families in Badiyan village, in the northern Çel Axa countryside, are calling for constitutional and legal recognition of Kurdish; activists from Syria’s unregistered and stateless population argue that citizenship alone is insufficient without reparations in the transitional justice process. ANHA also reports that Mazloum Abdi is to lead Interior Ministry meetings on integration, and that a presidential adviser has discussed folding Rojava and Kobani universities into the state system. Both lines are single budget entries, unconfirmed by any ministry. The sequence they describe runs from Decree No. 13 of January 2026, which approved citizenship and cultural rights, to the formal integration of the north-east administration into the Syrian state on 20 August.
Assessment: The 185,000 figure is doing political work, and the work is visible in its geography: by counting Damascus and Hama alongside Hasakah and Aleppo, ANHA converts a regional grievance into a national constitutional claim at exactly the moment its administration no longer exists to press one regionally. Distrust the number; do not dismiss what it is for. The verifiable object here is the ministry decision itself — a document that would show whether Decree No. 13’s cultural guarantees are being implemented or quietly narrowed. Watch, too, whether Abdi really is chairing integration meetings inside a Damascus ministry. If he is, the post-dissolution settlement is being managed from within rather than contested from outside.