A closed Hormuz is quietly underwriting the Suez Canal’s recovery, and Tehran just said it stays shut

Suez Canal Authority chairman Osama Rabie put FY2025/26 revenue at $4.67bn, up 23 percent. Planning and Economic Development Minister Ahmed Rostom said on 5 October that cargo tonnage rose 22 percent and vessel numbers nearly 9.8 percent, with activity climbing around 34 percent in the final quarter. The base remains low: revenue was $10.2bn in 2023 and fell to $4bn in 2024, against a record $9.4bn in FY2022/23. Monthly data show the slope. Rabie reported 1,358 vessels in August 2026, traffic up 27 percent year on year, and revenue of $567.1m against $326m in August 2025. Second-quarter revenue was $1.26bn, up 13 percent on roughly $1.1bn in the first quarter.

The other half of the picture is Iranian. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz to normal commercial traffic on 28 February 2026; a US-Iran ceasefire on 7 April halted major combat operations but Tehran continued efforts to exert control, according to Congressional Research Service product R45281. Al Jazeera reported on 27 August that traffic through the 33km chokepoint had fallen by roughly 95 percent from more than 100 vessels, six months into the war. On 31 October, according to a Times of Israel liveblog entry, a senior Iranian official — not named in the entry — said there would be no nuclear talks and no reopening of Hormuz until the United States accepts Iran’s demands. That is a statement rather than an event, and the original Iranian wire attribution has not been checked.

The carriers are returning on their own timetable. CMA CGM’s Christine Cabau, Executive Vice President for Assets and Operations, said in remarks reported on 14 October that the line was continuing its return to the canal as a permanent and sustainable route. Drewry projects a phased return reaching 80 percent of pre-diversion levels by February. The Authority said on 21 September that the canal remains safe and traffic is operating normally while Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb are disrupted. One caution on the numbers themselves: Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly was reported on 4 October putting canal revenue at about $4.4bn, against the Authority’s published $4.67bn for the same fiscal year — a gap between the head of government and the operator, three months after the books closed.

Assessment: The causal link between Hormuz and the canal’s second-quarter rise comes from analysts, not from the Authority, and should be held at that strength. But the exposure is structural regardless of who states it. Tanker traffic rerouted by a closed strait is revenue Cairo books and cannot defend, and it unwinds the day Washington and Tehran settle — which means an Iranian hardline statement reads, on this desk, as support for the canal line of the budget. That is an uncomfortable position for a government entering a final IMF review with a $9.7bn financing need. The Madbouly discrepancy is the smaller warning: Egypt’s headline canal figure varies by speaker.