Hormuz traffic falls to seven ships in a day while Iraq trucks Basra crude north to Ceyhan

United States forces struck Qeshm Island, the largest Iranian island in the Strait of Hormuz, overnight on 2–3 November, hours before American polls opened. The Wall Street Journal reported it first on unnamed US officials; three officials told CNN the strikes were “limited” and “defensive in nature” and followed Iranian fire at an American aircraft. President Donald Trump then confirmed the strikes personally to Fox News, saying they hit an anti-aircraft facility. On 3 November Mohsen Rezaei, secretary-general of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, called the American response to Tehran’s seven conditions for reopening the Strait unconvincing, and said on Press TV that only acceptance and performance of all seven would reopen it. No outlet reached in our sweep has published the seven conditions. Qatari mediators have shuttled to Tehran at least three times in ten days, according to Al Jazeera, Reuters and The New Arab, with no Qatari official on the record in any of it. Markets read the week as de-escalation: Brent printed $105.12 in early Asian trade on 3 November, then closed at $99.20 on 4 November, down 4.25 per cent on the day, per Trading Economics.

The traffic figures are the part that does not move with the headlines. Windward, the commercial maritime-intelligence firm, logged seven vessels crossing the Strait of Hormuz on 2 November — five inbound, two outbound. UNCTAD recorded around 20 million barrels a day transiting the Strait in 2024 and transits falling by about 95 per cent after the conflict began. The attrition is not confined to the Strait itself: Windward logs a vessel struck by a projectile at anchor some eleven nautical miles west of Bukha, Oman, on 21 October, and United Against Nuclear Iran — an advocacy organisation with a declared position on Iran — reports the damaged tanker RITI, struck on 29 October while transiting outbound near Khasab. The US Maritime Administration’s advisory 2026-013 now warns that vessels with Saudi association, including any ship in a fleet whose company calls at Saudi ports, face elevated Houthi risk. On the Bab al-Mandeb leg, daily transits had already fallen from 50 ships to 32 after the blockade, The National reported in August.

What fills the gap is being built in concrete and diesel. A source at Iraq’s North Oil Company told Kurdistan24’s Kirkuk correspondent that SOMO is now pushing 500,000 barrels a day of Kirkuk, Kurdistan Region and Basra crude through the Kurdistan pipeline to Ceyhan — up from a 250,000-barrel restart in March — with roughly 200,000 barrels of Basra crude trucked north to collection stations at Sarallu and Khurmala. Kurdistan24 itself notes no official has confirmed the figure, and no SOMO statement, BOTAŞ loading schedule or tanker-tracking data has corroborated it. Egypt is collecting the other half of the diversion: the Suez Canal Authority recorded 1,358 vessels in August 2026 against 1,070 a year earlier, and $567.1 million in revenue against $326 million, per Ahram Online — a 74 per cent revenue gain on a 51 per cent tonnage gain. Cairo pays for it on the import bill. The National, citing World Bank data, puts Egypt’s external debt at $166.45 billion, with $60.9 billion of repayments and interest due between July 2026 and June 2027, of which about $19.1 billion is central bank deposits, mostly Gulf.

Assessment: Distrust three things this week. First, the plan reporting: American officials have briefed that a post-midterm campaign could begin from 4 November with three carriers on station, and that remains anonymous-sourced intention, not an event. Second, the Ceyhan number: 500,000 barrels a day rests on one unnamed company source relayed by three outlets, which is one claim with three bylines. Third, the Trading Economics WTI print of minus 8.11 per cent against Brent’s minus 4.25 on the same session, a spread wide enough to suggest a baseline artefact rather than a market. The durable point is structural. Rerouting is expensive and slow to build, and therefore slow to unwind. Trucking Basra crude to a northern pipeline, re-contracting around Suez, pricing Saudi-association risk into hull cover — none of that reverses the morning Hormuz reopens. Tehran’s leverage is real while the Strait is shut and depreciates the longer it stays shut. That is an argument for a deal sooner rather than later, and it is visible in the oil price before it is visible in any communiqué.