Tehran takes its war on Starlink to the regulators, summoning Norway’s ambassador

Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, told Tehran Times on 13 October that Iran has developed technical capabilities to identify and disrupt unauthorised Starlink terminals, while intensifying efforts through international regulatory channels to compel the service to comply with telecommunications rules governing operations inside Iranian territory. Iranian officials have argued that the United States and Israel used satellite communications infrastructure to support activities directed against the Islamic Republic. The detection claim is an assertion by a state body with an obvious interest in deterrence, and we have seen no independent report of terminal seizures or prosecutions dated after 13 October that would corroborate it. A day later, Al Jazeera reported from Tehran that authorities had pledged to continue the crackdown alongside further restrictions on the global internet. Starlink is outlawed in Iran on national security grounds; use of satellite services and distribution of terminals carry fines and imprisonment.

The more consequential track is regulatory. Al Jazeera notes Norway’s role in the constellation’s regulatory filings, and Tehran Times reports that in October Iran formally protested to Oslo over “continued failure” to act against unauthorised Starlink operations, with the Foreign Ministry summoning Norwegian Ambassador Paul Bjornstad and demanding immediate measures to halt transmissions. Al Jazeera dates the summons to 4 October. Tehran Times further claims that at its 101st meeting in March 2026 the ITU Radio Regulations Board concluded Norway’s actions were not compliant — an assertion by an Iranian state outlet that we have not checked against the ITU record. On shutdowns, Al Jazeera reports that Iran’s 90 million people have endured two lengthy state-imposed global internet shutdowns in 2026: three weeks during January’s nationwide protests, and 88 days at the start of the ongoing war that began with US and Israeli strikes on 28 February.

Assessment: The capability claim and the regulatory claim should be read as serving different audiences. Terminal-detection announcements are addressed inward, at Iranians deciding whether a dish on the roof is worth the risk; the deterrent works whether or not the geolocation does. The Norway file is addressed outward, and it is the part worth tracking. If the ITU Radio Regulations Board finding is real, Tehran has an instrument no jammer provides — a multilateral process in which the filing state, not SpaceX, is the respondent, and in which other governments with the same grievance can line up behind it. Treat the shutdown arithmetic carefully: a competing 138-day continuous figure is circulating from tertiary sources and does not reconcile with Al Jazeera’s two discrete episodes.