Iraq’s claimed October export volume cannot be squared with a closed Strait of Hormuz

The figures in circulation do not reconcile. Al Jazeera, writing on 16 October, described Iraq’s pre-war position as roughly 3.5 million barrels per day moving through Hormuz, supplying about 90 per cent of government revenue. Bloomberg reported on 2 June that Iraq was poised to more than triple Kurdistan pipeline exports precisely because the strait remained shut. The National reported on 1 August that Baghdad and Ankara had signed a one-year pipeline deal with a stated 750,000 bpd capacity, framed as a prelude to a comprehensive agreement targeting more than a million. A figure of roughly 450,000 bpd heading toward Ceyhan in early October, attributed to North Oil Company by the outlet Channel8, reaches this desk only through a paid Substack relay and is not usable as sourced. Against all that, Iraq Business News reported on 20 October that exports had “reportedly” risen above 3.4 million bpd, up from a September average of 3.0 million, routed through both Hormuz and Ceyhan.

The fiscal stakes make the discrepancy worth settling rather than splitting. Shafaq News put Baghdad’s spending on public-sector salaries and social welfare in the first half of 2026 at 44.627 trillion dinars, about $34.1 billion, or roughly 82 per cent of total federal outlays. Al Jazeera’s 16 October report on the completed cabinet described a government facing severe liquidity shortages traceable to the conflict. The Kurdistan Regional Government said in January that Baghdad had paid only 41 per cent of the Region’s three-year entitlements — the KRG’s own claim, not an audited figure. On the utilities side, AGBI reported on 13 October that Iraq plans to raise electricity imports from Turkey and link its grid to Saudi Arabia; MEES, writing on 2 October, attributed the deepening summer shortfall to gas shortages, weak finances and the regional conflict that began on 28 February.

Assessment: One of these numbers is wrong, and which one matters more than the cabinet. Even at the Turkish deal’s nominal 750,000 bpd ceiling, Ceyhan cannot account for a 3.4 million-barrel total; the arithmetic requires substantial waterborne loading, which means either Hormuz has partially reopened — unreported anywhere we can find — or the October figure is inflated, double-counted or simply repeated. Note that Iraq Business News hedged it with “reportedly” and attributed it to no ministry. Nothing should be charted off this until SOMO or the Ministry of Oil publishes. The salary line is the reason: at 82 per cent of spending, Baghdad’s export volume is its payroll.